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“WE ARE HERE TO HELP EACH OTHER”:  
RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY, DIVINE HIDDENNESS, 
AND THE RESPONSIBILITY ARGUMENT1
Dustin Crummett
Richard Swinburne and Travis Dumsday have defended what J. L. Schellen-
berg calls “the responsibility argument” as a response to the problem of divine 
hiddenness. Schellenberg, meanwhile, has levied various objections against 
the responsibility argument. In this paper, I develop a version of the respon-
sibility argument and discuss some advantages it has over those defended by 
either Swinburne or Dumsday. I then show how my version can withstand 
Schellenberg’s criticisms.
I. Introduction
God could have done, and could do now, much more to make his exis-
tence and presence and intentions evident to us—by, say, increasing the 
frequency of signs and wonders, or making it easier for us to have intense 
experiences of God’s love, or opening a Twitter feed.2 Many of God’s chil-
dren don’t believe that he exists; many others believe that he exists but 
have catastrophically false beliefs about what he’s like and what he wants; 
still more, quite apart from whatever they believe about God, find them-
selves unable to experience his presence during the darkest periods of 
their lives. These three phenomena often seem to occur without regard for 
what the agent deserves or would most benefit from.3 No human parent 
1The title here is taken partly from the hymn “Will You Let Me Be Your Servant,” which 
contains the following verse—one which helps illustrate some of the value judgments which 
the response to the problem of divine hiddenness developed in this paper relies on: “We are 
pilgrims on a journey / We are travelers on a road / We are here to help each other / walk the 
mile and bear the load.” Other relevant verses include “I will hold the Christ-light for you / 
in the nighttime of your fear / I will hold my hand out to you / speak the peace you long to 
hear” and “When we sing to God in Heaven / We will find such harmony / born of all we’ve 
known together / of Christ’s love and agony.”
2Think of Judas’s line in Jesus Christ: Superstar: “Every time I look at you I can’t under-
stand . . . why’d you choose such a backward time and such a strange land? If you’d come 
today you’d have reached a whole nation / Israel in 4 BC had no mass communication / Don’t 
you get me wrong . . . I only wanna know.”
3The typical name in the literature for non-belief that isn’t a result of some kind of 
wrong-doing on the part of the non-believer is “inculpable non-belief.” Alexander Pruss 
has suggested to me that there’s no way to know that we wouldn’t all have a constant and 
abiding sense of God’s existence and presence if we were all morally perfect. Then, at least 
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would ever dream of leaving their children in such a position, yet God, if 
there is a God, has let this happen to his children billions of times over and 
shows no signs of changing course. Accordingly, if we believe in God, we 
are existentially shaken and intellectually perplexed. This is what I mean 
by the problem of divine hiddenness.4
Theists with religious affiliations won’t just want their response to this 
problem to account for these three data points. They will also want it to 
be consistent with what their tradition has had to say about how such re-
grettable states of affairs come to pass. Many religious traditions suggest 
that we have been tasked with helping one another come to knowledge 
of and relationship with God, and that helping us fulfill this task is one 
of the major reasons God has established religious communities. Many 
also accept the natural corollary that when we fail in these tasks, we can 
harm the ability of other people—themselves totally innocent—to come to 
knowledge of and relationship with God. Within my own tradition—the 
Christian tradition—there is ample scriptural evidence in support of this 
potentially (assuming the wrongdoing bears the right kind of relation to the effect,) every, or 
nearly every, case of non-belief might be culpable in some sense. If we are willing to grant—
as Pruss is, and as I argue for above—that many atheists are in a morally equivalent situation 
(regarding overall moral merit, willingness to submit to God’s commands, etc.) to many 
theists, then theists will likewise bear culpability for being such that their sins could have led 
them into unbelief (just as everyone who drives drunk is culpable for putting themselves in 
a situation where they could recklessly hurt an innocent person, even though not everyone 
who drives drunk does so.) We then will not have, or will not have a very widespread, 
problem of inculpable non-belief, but we will have a similar looking problem—why does 
the God of love allow these people to remain ignorant of his existence when he reveals it to 
their neighbors, who are seemingly no more deserving or better situated, and presumably 
does so without violating his justice and without other unacceptable ill-effects? Since it is the 
commonly accepted way of framing the problem, I talk in the main text about the problem 
of inculpable non-belief, but what I say can also be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the problem 
of at-least-no-more-culpable-than-anyone-else non-belief. (There are other terms sometimes 
used in the literature—nonresistant unbelief, for instance—but similar worries will apply to 
these terms as well; maybe all of us, on account of our sinfulness, resist God to some extent, 
etc.) Remarks analogous to those in this footnote also apply to the other two aspects of the 
problem I discuss.
4Many philosophers construe the problem of divine hiddenness more narrowly than I do 
here, thinking of it solely in terms of non-belief. I don’t think there’s any substantive differ-
ence there between me and them; divine hiddenness, I imagine, isn’t anything like a natural 
kind, and the problems are equally problematic no matter what heading we file them under. 
I treat the various problematic data as aspects of one overarching problem here for pragmatic 
reasons—because I suspect that they’re importantly related, and thus that thinking about 
them together (particularly, as it happens, in the context of the responsibility argument, 
which I think has something to say about all of them) might be fruitful. Swinburne, Schellen-
berg and Dumsday all think of the problem of divine hiddenness as pretty much the problem 
of inculpable non-belief. Accordingly, when I discuss how my account differs from those of 
Swinburne and Dumsday, I will primarily discuss how it differs with respect to the problem 
of inculpable non-belief, and when I discuss how my account fares against Schellenberg’s 
objections, I will primarily discuss how it fares as a response to the problem of inculpable 
non-belief in light of these objections. I will do so, though, with the understanding that, 
in each case, what they have to say about the responsibility argument as a response to the 
problem of divine hiddenness could mostly also be applied to the responsibility argument 
as a response to the other problematic data, mutatis mutandis. (I am grateful to Errin Clark for 
pressing me to clarify this.)
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view. The obvious example in support of the first proposition is the Great 
Commission:
And Jesus came and spake unto them, saying, All power is given unto me in 
heaven and in earth. Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them 
in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost: Teaching 
them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you: and, lo, I am 
with you always, even unto the end of the world. Amen.5
And in support of the second, consider:
But whoso shall offend one of these little ones which believe in me, it were 
better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and that he were 
drowned in the depth of the sea. Woe unto the world because of offences! 
for it must needs be that offences come; but woe to that man by whom the 
offence cometh!6
Or:
But woe unto you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for ye shut up the king-
dom of heaven against men: for ye neither go in yourselves, neither suffer ye 
them that are entering to go in. Woe unto you, scribes and Pharisees, hypo-
crites! for ye devour widows’ houses, and for a pretence make long prayer: 
therefore ye shall receive the greater damnation. Woe unto you, scribes and 
Pharisees, hypocrites! for ye compass sea and land to make one proselyte, 
and when he is made, ye make him twofold more the child of hell than 
yourselves.7
Also consider St. James’s warning that not many people are suited to be-
come religious teachers, since teachers will be held to a higher standard,8 
which is well explained by the thought that these teachers have great 
power to affect those under them and accordingly have an obligation to 
wield that power well. The dependency of our religious life on our reli-
gious communities also seems to be well-confirmed empirically by data 
on how religious beliefs vary with culture, upbringing, and other factors.9
5Matthew 28:18–20. All biblical references are from the King James Version.
6Matthew 18:6–7.
7Matthew 23:13–15.
8James 3:1.
9See, for instance, The Global Religious Landscape: A Report on the Size and Distribution 
of the World’s Major Religious Groups as of 2010. (Pew Research Center, 2012), http://www 
.pewforum.org/files/2012/12/globalReligion-full.pdf. One could, of course, hold something 
equivalent to William Lane Craig’s position, on which, to a substantial extent, the expla-
nation for the correlation between societal context and religious affiliation runs the other 
way—the people who never wind up in a position to form a relationship with God are the 
ones that God (using middle knowledge) knew weren’t going to form a relationship with 
him no matter what. But this view doesn’t change the fact that societal context seems to have 
a substantial impact on religious belief, apart from the choices we make or would have made; 
stories like Craig’s might provide a (very ad hoc and implausible, I think, though I won’t 
argue it here) way of rejecting the claim I make despite the empirical evidence, but don’t 
show that the empirical evidence fails to support the claim in question. (For a statements of 
Craig’s position, see “‘No Other Name’: A Middle Knowledge Perspective on the Exclusivity 
of Salvation through Christ,” Faith and Philosophy 6 [1989]: 172–188.)
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These thoughts add (at least for some of us) a constraint on how we 
might respond to the problem of divine hiddenness, but they also suggest 
a way forward. Perhaps something very important depends on our having 
this kind of responsibility for each other, and perhaps this explains God’s 
giving us this kind of responsibility, and perhaps failures by some to live 
up to the tasks with which they’ve been charged help explain why other 
innocent people suffer in the three ways we were worried about. This is 
the core of the response to the problem of divine hiddenness known as 
the “responsibility argument.” Accounts like this have been defended 
by Richard Swinburne and Travis Dumsday.10 J. L. Schellenberg, mean-
while, has launched trenchant attacks on the responsibility argument, 
questioning whether it is empirically plausible to believe that we have the 
relevant sort of responsibility for one another and whether God would 
want to give us this sort of responsibility to begin with. In this paper, I will 
present a version of the responsibility argument and defend it as a partial 
response to the problem of divine hiddenness—as something which has 
the potential to weaken the atheistic argument from divine hiddenness, to 
help reduce our perplexity concerning God’s actions, and to help us better 
pick up on what divine hiddenness might tell us about our role in the 
world. I will defend the responsibility argument only as a partial response 
to the problem of divine hiddenness; I’m not so bold as to claim that it can 
provide a satisfying answer to every case of hiddenness, only that it can 
provide significant help in a reasonably large number of cases and thus 
can meaningfully contribute to a complete account.11
10See Richard Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1998) and Travis Dumsday, “Divine Hiddenness and the Responsibility Argument,” Philoso-
phia Christi 12:2 (2010): 357–371.
11I take a “partial response” to involve attempting to address, at least to some extent, just 
some cases of hiddenness, and a “complete response” to involve trying to address every, or 
almost every, case of hiddenness (where “addressing” just means “having something to say 
about.”) A response might involve offering, as I do here, a story about why God might allow 
some cases of hiddenness, but it might also, in the vein of skeptical theism, mean explaining 
why sometimes lacking such a story isn’t unacceptably bad. A referee has called into ques-
tion the interestingness of merely partial responses. My view is that the way to proceed in 
evaluating the argument from hiddenness is to develop promising partial responses as well 
as can be done and then to see how and whether those partial responses might fit together 
into a plausible complete response. This will probably give us a heavily disunified complete 
response, but, while disunified accounts are bad when it comes to some phenomena, I think 
we should expect one here. I think it would be awfully surprising if we had either total 
ignorance or total understanding of God’s purposes in allowing hiddenness, so I think it’s 
fine to plead ignorance about God’s purposes in some cases. Where we do have good guesses 
about God’s purposes, I don’t see any reason to think either that those purposes will be few 
in number in any one case or that they will be pretty much the same across cases (any more 
than we should expect that to be the case when it comes to, say, my purposes in writing 
emails). Accordingly, we shouldn’t be surprised by there being a lot of different stories, each 
of which gives us plausible accounts of at least some of God’s reasons in at least some cases. 
Partial responses are thus interesting because exploring their strengths and weaknesses is 
a practically necessary step on the way to developing an overall answer to the problem of 
divine hiddenness (or, if there isn’t an answer, to finding that out.) Why limit myself to 
developing a merely partial response here? Well, here are some partial reasons: if I’m right 
about the metatheory, developing partial responses is important and it has to happen sooner 
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In the next section, I will lay out my version of the responsibility argu-
ment and show how it can help us to meet the challenges we face. In the 
third section, I will respond to some empirical arguments by Schellenberg 
suggesting that it’s not plausible to believe that we have the sort of respon-
sibility for one another that the argument requires. In the fourth section, I 
will address some arguments by Schellenberg claiming that God wouldn’t 
want to give us the relevant sort of responsibility anyway—that the goods 
in question could be achieved in other, less harmful ways, and that, if they 
couldn’t, they wouldn’t be worth the cost anyway. Along the way, the re-
spects in which my account differs from those propounded by Swinburne 
and Dumsday should become clear.
II. The Responsibility Argument
The core of my account is this: it is—at least in some cases—good, and one 
of God’s aims, not only that we come to know God’s reality and purposes, 
and come to know and appreciate these with the right intentions, and 
come to enter into relationship with God, but also that we come to all this 
partly through participation in communities in which we can be mutu-
ally responsible for one another’s spiritual development and knowledge 
of God. This is good because it gives us an opportunity to serve God and 
one another in a very important task and because it gives us the ability to 
form relationships with God and one another that are based partly on our 
positively and freely influencing one another’s spiritual development and 
knowledge of God.
The mechanisms through which religious communities can aid in 
their members’ feeling God’s presence and coming to know God’s reality 
and purposes should be relatively familiar. Swinburne and Dumsday 
focus overwhelmingly on our taking responsibility for one another by 
developing and sharing natural theological arguments, and, to a lesser 
extent, by preaching theological doctrines and praying for the conversion 
of others. My account will include these things but will be broader and, 
I think, more realistic in the mechanisms it posits and emphasizes. (By 
“posits and emphasizes,” I mean both that my account considers mecha-
nisms that Swinburne and Dumsday don’t and that it differs in how much 
work it proportionally assigns to the mechanisms they all consider. I like 
natural theological arguments as much as anybody, but while they are 
the centerpieces of Swinburne and Dumsday’s accounts—Dumsday only 
mentions things besides natural theological arguments in a footnote—I 
suspect that they play very little role, if any, in the lives of most religious 
believers.)12
or later; I don’t have a complete response and am not qualified to develop one; life is brief; 
Faith and Philosophy has a word limit.
12The best versions of natural theological arguments—by which I mean something like 
the ones that are sophisticated enough to withstand the sorts of objections that are likely to 
occur to reasonably competent philosophers—are, in their details and maybe sometimes in 
their totality, often probably not even comprehensible to most religious believers.
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The mechanisms by which we take responsibility for one another may 
well include developing and sharing philosophical arguments, but I think 
they will further wind up encompassing pretty much anything that, given 
theism, we would expect an ideal religious community to do. It’s true that, 
by fostering strong intellectual communities, we can both help justify the 
rationality of religious beliefs and better work out their implications for 
day to day life (a task which will involve academic work going far beyond 
philosophy!) But there’s more. By encouraging one another in individual 
spiritual disciplines, such as prayer, and participating in communal ones, 
such as collective worship, we can help bring about the spiritual benefits 
that these are supposed to provide.13 By doing good deeds and building 
loving relationships with one another, we can transform one another’s 
characters and thus make ourselves more receptive to God’s will. We can 
provide occasions for others to perceive God’s workings—either in non-
inferential ways, such as those defended by Plantinga,14 or in inferential 
ways, such as those defended by Moser15—in our own lives.16 All of these 
things taken together can affect the ways in which we are naturally in-
clined to interpret the world. Accordingly, one’s community can affect 
the evidence available to them regarding God’s reality and purposes, the 
arguments they bring to bear on that evidence, the intuitions they bring to 
bear on those arguments, and their ability, intellectually and volitionally, 
to properly evaluate all of this, as well as their ability to relate to God 
and to experience God’s presence. Even religious skeptics, or those with 
significantly false religious beliefs, will—at least in some circumstances, 
at least to a degree—be able to contribute positively to this project. An 
atheist, for instance, who attacks an untenable or harmful conception of 
God or God’s will may not only achieve secularly recognized goods but 
also help all of us move closer to the real truth about the transcendent.17
However—so the account goes—if we are to be genuinely responsible 
for one another’s spiritual development, there’s always the possibility that 
we might neglect our duties to one another. We can see how this might 
bear on the existence of hiddenness. In cases covered by this account, there 
13Swinburne considers the possibility that hiddenness might be the result of moral evil 
“if there is an experience of God to be had for those who, having heard some preacher tell 
them what God is like, begin to pray to him” and if such a person intentionally avoids feeling 
God’s call “because in consequence they would see the obligation to lead a different sort of 
life,” but he does not consider the possibility that such a person’s failure to experience God 
in prayer might be someone else’s fault (Swinburne, Providence, 203).
14Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
15Paul Moser, The Elusive God (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 126–143.
16Matthew 5:16: “Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works, 
and glorify your Father which is in heaven.”
17We might worry about whether such a person deserves credit for the goods they bring 
about, since they don’t believe in them. I think the answer will often be “yes.” Suppose—I 
think this is actually fairly common—the atheist thinks, “Look, God almost certainly doesn’t 
exist, but if he does, and he’s good, he surely wouldn’t approve of this—and, yes, that gives 
me yet another reason to fight it.” It seems that such a person does deserve some credit for 
the goods they bring about, even though they believed they wouldn’t bring them about.
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is culpability, but it doesn’t have to rest with the person who (for instance) 
holds the false belief; they might well have investigated the relevant issues 
honestly, extensively, and rationally. It might, instead, be that someone 
somewhere else along the line failed to live up to their duties.18
This failure might simply take the form of people not sufficiently aiding 
one another, but there are also plenty of ways someone might culpably 
pose a positive hindrance to others. By fostering anti-intellectualism out 
of cowardice, arrogance, or laziness, someone might prevent the doing 
or dissemination of work that might help us discern God’s reality and 
purposes, or they might convince someone of dangerously false proposi-
tions about what God wants from his followers, or they might interfere 
with someone’s ability to believe in God by convincing them that doing 
so involves holding rationally untenable positions. One can abuse one’s 
position in a religious community to further one’s own selfish ends, help 
foster hatred and intolerance, turn religion into a tool of violence and op-
pression, or hoard resources while neglecting those in need. In doing so, 
one might positively obstruct the communal ways of knowing God’s re-
ality and purposes while either causing people to mistakenly believe that 
this is what God wants of his followers or creating emotional barriers that 
might interfere with someone’s ability to relate to God.19 The same could 
be true of committing less dramatic interpersonal wrongs as well. And, 
here again, even religious skeptics will often have the ability to negatively 
impact others in ways for which they are culpable. We might think here, 
for instance, of the efforts by some communist nations to violently stamp 
out religion.
It is important to note that, in a case covered by this account, the cul-
pability wouldn’t have to rest with those immediately around the person 
in question. It might rest with them, but they might have done the best 
they could, or they might have possessed harmful flaws for which they 
were not themselves culpable. Responsibility could rest with people very 
18The most natural reading of this account would be that it requires our having libertarian 
free will. Some, however, have argued that compatibilist conceptions of moral responsibility 
are sufficient for free will theodicies; if these arguments succeed, then compatibilist free will 
would also be suitable here. (See, for instance, John Bishop, “Compatibilism and the Free 
Will Defense,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71:2 (1993): 104–120; Bruce Langtry, God, the 
Best, and Evil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); and Robert Audi, Rationality and Reli-
gious Commitment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
19Swinburne acknowledges the potential role of non-intellectual factors in determining 
whether one comes to believe in God when he considers that “humans . . . may have refused 
to allow themselves to feel the force of the [good natural theological] arguments because in 
consequence they would see the obligation to lead a different sort of life” and tells us that 
“above all, it would be a moral evil if someone had an experience of God and then tried to 
persuade themselves that it did not occur” (Swinburne, Providence, 203.) However, Swin-
burne does not consider the possibility that someone might have such emotional barriers 
for reasons other than their own wickedness. Someone might find it extremely difficult to 
accept religious claims because they grew up in an area wracked by religious violence or 
faced crushing discrimination that was justified by invoking religious tenets, but surely in 
such a case the responsibility for this person’s reluctance would rest with the people who 
committed the wrongs in question rather than with the person who is unable to believe.
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far removed in time and space. There is nothing strange about this; it is, 
in fact, pretty clear that many people do experience spiritual obstacles 
which have at least a partial root in, say, abuse scandals that did not di-
rectly impact them or their communities, or in the merging of political and 
religious power in the late Roman empire, and so on.
Finally, I ought to say something here about the implications of this 
account for the afterlife. Many theists believe that everyone who, at the 
moment of death, has their beliefs about God wrong in certain important 
sorts of ways, or has their relationship with God out of joint in certain 
important ways, will get damned to hell forever. If, as accommodationism 
assumes, many of these people aren’t relevantly at fault for their false be-
liefs to a greater degree than anybody else, we will need to have something 
to say about this, unless we are willing to say that God allows some people 
to be damned who he apparently (since he saved their equally vicious 
neighbors) could have saved without undue negative consequences. We 
could just give up belief in eternal hell altogether and accept some form 
of universalism, holding that everyone, eventually, will be reconciled to 
God.20 Alternatively, we could believe that if we haven’t had a fair shot 
at being reconciled to God in our earthly lives, God gives us additional 
chances after death, where he corrects for the factors that caused us to 
inculpably stray. If one is absolutely committed to the claim that everyone 
whose relationship with God isn’t relevantly appropriate at the moment of 
death gets damned, we could even reconcile that with this account if we’re 
willing to admit some really weird scenarios. Maybe, in the last instant of 
one’s life, God miraculously slows that person’s perception of time down, 
“Occurrence at Owl Creek Bridge”-style, corrects for whatever factors 
caused the inculpable error, and gives the person a chance to somehow re-
spond. This does seem like a very strange scenario. But I guess it’s the sort 
of thing God might do if there really is something that important about 
ensuring that our fate is fairly decided at the moment of death. Any of 
these routes avoids the untoward consequence we were worried about.
We can now see how this account, if true, helps to address the problem 
of divine hiddenness as I’ve construed it here. It respects the fact, con-
firmed both empirically and, for many of us, by our religious traditions, 
that we have immense power to influence one another’s religious lives, 
and it gives us at least a partial explanation of why God might give us such 
power. Once that’s in place, we can see how the account can contribute to 
explaining the evils I discussed at the beginning of this paper: because we 
can influence one another’s ability to relate to God and beliefs about God’s 
existence, nature, and will, we can unfairly harm one another in each of 
these respects. It does this without minimizing the intrinsic badness of 
20For a philosophical and (Christian) theological defense of universalism, see John Kronen 
and Eric Reitan, God’s Final Victory: A Comparative Philosophical Case for Universalism (New 
York: Continuum, 2011). For a fairly brief biblical defense of universalism, see Keith DeRose, 
“Universalism and the Bible” (Personal website, 1999), http://pantheon.yale.edu/~kd47/univ 
.htm.
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hiddenness or the things that flow from it, or claiming that it always leads 
to greater goods and is therefore just as well, or claiming that it’s always 
deserved anyway.21 Finally, I’ll argue in the fourth section that it can do 
these things while preserving God’s concern, not only for the world as a 
whole, but also for each of his individual children.
We can also now see some of the major ways in which my account differs 
from those offered by Swinburne and Dumsday. One is the way I pointed 
out in the first section: their accounts are aimed squarely at the problem 
of inculpable non-belief, while mine attempts to address a broader range 
of problems. As I said, it doesn’t seem to me that we’re disagreeing on any-
thing here; it’s simply that they adopt a narrower focus while I suspect 
that considering all these issues together might prove fruitful.
Where they cover the same ground, our accounts also differ in some 
more substantive respects. First, as noted above, my account of the mecha-
nisms by which we take responsibility for one another is broader in its 
emphases than theirs; I think this provides us a more realistic account of 
the situation we actually find ourselves in and also, as we’ll see in the next 
section, strengthens our hand against Schellenberg’s claim that God has 
not given us the tools necessary to take responsibility for one another in 
the relevant ways.
Second, both Swinburne and Dumsday portray God as intentionally 
leaving certain people ignorant of his existence, so as to bring about the 
great good of others being able to teach them.22 In cases covered by my 
account, meanwhile, God doesn’t purposefully leave people ignorant, and 
the goods he has in mind don’t require that anyone ever actually be igno-
rant; rather, he gives us the ability to influence one another’s beliefs for 
good or ill, and keeping others from becoming ignorant of his existence 
(or from forming false beliefs about his will, or from being unable to form 
a robust relationship with him) is just as much a valuable exercise of re-
sponsibility as rescuing someone from such a state. If God’s intentionally 
leaving people in the dark so that others can rescue them looks to us like 
an unpalatable case of his treating them as mere means, we might find my 
version preferable. Further, as we’ll see in the next section, my story might 
leave us better positioned to respond to Schellenberg’s charge that the re-
sponsibility argument can’t account for spatially and temporally isolated 
non-theists.
Third, throughout I have stressed the importance of mutual responsi-
bility. Swinburne and Dumsday primarily speak of the responsibility as 
running one way—as being the responsibility of those who have the truth 
about God to teach it to those who don’t.23 Certainly, some people might 
21For an argument that taking attitudes like these towards evils more generally might 
undermine our motivation to combat them, see William Hasker, The Triumph of God over Evil 
(Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2008) 193–195.
22See Swinburne, Providence, 210–212 and Dumsday, “Divine,” 365.
23Dumsday explicitly tells us that the responsibility argument “is designed to show 
that a loving God would allow some nonresistant non-belief in order to foster the good of 
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have greater knowledge of God than others and thus have more in the 
way of knowledge to offer those others than those others have to offer 
them. It will happen rarely, though, if ever, that we have such a compre-
hensive grasp of the truth, and our interlocutor has so little of value to 
offer, that we have nothing to learn from them. I think this picture more 
accurately reflects the situation in which we seem to find ourselves. I also 
think adopting it is likely to have practical benefits; I think that treating 
evangelism as a genuine dialogue—one in which we think we have a hold 
on very important truths, but in which we are prepared to listen to and 
learn from our dialogue partner—is both more likely to be effective and 
more likely to help keep us from falling into the sins often perpetrated by 
those who are too confident that they have the whole truth and nothing 
but it (sins ranging from workaday bigotry to political persecution.) I also 
think, as we’ll see in section four, that this view helps us address some of 
Schellenberg’s normative criticisms of the responsibility argument.
Finally, when I respond to Schellenberg’s criticisms of the responsi-
bility argument in the next few sections, I will consider a few points that 
Swinburne and Dumsday don’t (to my knowledge) explicitly address 
anywhere. Meanwhile, on some of the points that they do address, my 
response will differ importantly from theirs in ways that we’ll see—ways 
that, I think, weaken the force of Schellenberg’s objections.
Construed in the right way, then, the responsibility argument has a lot to 
be said for it—or so I say. In the next section, I will address Schellenberg’s 
empirical criticisms of the responsibility argument, and in the section after 
that, I’ll discuss his normative ones. As I mentioned in the first section, 
Schellenberg, like Swinburne and Dumsday, construes the problem of di-
vine hiddenness more narrowly than I do here, and so his arguments all 
center around inculpable non-belief, but much of what he has to say—and 
much of what I have to say in response—could, with some modification, 
be applied to the other problematic data that I have discussed.
III. Schellenberg’s Empirical Arguments
III.A. Do We Have the Necessary Tools?
Schellenberg has called into question whether it is plausible to believe that 
we actually have the ability to take responsibility for one another in the 
human responsibility, with some people having the task of leading others to a belief in God” 
(Dumsday, “Divine,” 358), speaks of the responsibility in question as being “the responsi-
bility of some to teach others about God” (p. 364), and so on. For Swinburne, there seems 
to be room for mutual responsibility in situations where everyone is ignorant about God, 
but once some people achieve “knowledge of God”—which some people apparently have, 
and which seems to function in pretty much a binary way (that is, you have knowledge of 
God or you don’t)—everything seems to become about the responsibility of those who have 
such knowledge to impart it to those who don’t: “In the pursuit of this very great good, the 
knowledge of God, it is good that humans cooperate, cooperate in investigation when none 
have found the great good; and when some have found it and others have not, that those 
who have found should try to help those who have not, to find it. What a good thing it is that 
those who know should be able to teach those who do not—in all matters, but above all in 
this most important of matters!” (Swinburne, Providence, 211.)
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way required by the argument. Schellenberg believes the responsibility 
argument requires the claim that theists are “possessed of evidence that 
clearly supports God’s existence and that honest inquirers will see to sup-
port God’s existence,” which he rejects on the grounds that “the evidence 
that various individuals have claimed to provide support for God’s exis-
tence is often evidence that inculpable non-believers who fail to believe 
even after long investigation and soul-searching have considered.”24 
Schellenberg is clearly thinking of our affecting one another primarily 
by producing and publicizing things like natural theological arguments. 
Of course, even then, we needn’t claim that any theists actually have, or 
have had, evidence of the sort in question. Perhaps, due to someone’s 
negligence, the arguments in question were never developed, or were 
lost. Even recognizing this, one can still see the force of Schellenberg’s 
objection. Evaluating philosophical arguments is very difficult, and even 
the best don’t convince everyone who honestly examines them. Further, 
many people lack the tools to evaluate complex philosophical arguments 
and aren’t sure which authorities to trust. Thus, even if theists have, or 
could have, developed natural theological arguments strong enough to 
make it rational for any given person to believe in God, holding the rest 
of society constant, it seems doubtful whether everyone who honestly in-
quired would see that this is the case. St. Thomas—who I suppose was a 
fan of natural theology if anybody ever was—recognized this point and 
argued that special self-revelation on the part of God was necessary partly 
because of it:
Even as regards those truths about God which human reason could have 
discovered, it was necessary that man should be taught by a divine revela-
tion; because the truth about God such as reason could discover, would only 
be known by a few, and that after a long time, and with the admixture of 
many errors.25
Complementing the discussion of developing and publicizing natural 
theological arguments, Swinburne briefly considers that, by preaching 
certain theological doctrines, we might cause someone to pray and thus 
have an experience of God,26 and Dumsday mentions teaching theological 
doctrines to one’s children.27 Doing these things might well have such 
good results, but here again, many honest atheists are already well aware 
of what God is supposed to be like and that many people think we’re sup-
posed to pray to him. Many were once religious themselves, and lost their 
faith against their will; many tried praying, but to no avail. Without an 
24John Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1993), 192.
25Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. by the Fathers of the English Dominican 
Province (1920), http://www.newadvent.org/summa/ , I-I, Q. 1. A. 1.
26Swinburne, Providence, 203, 211–212.
27Dumsday, “Divine,” 365.
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expanded conception of the mechanisms by which we take responsibility 
for one another, this response won’t have much to say about these people.
Finally, Swinburne mentions that “parish discussion groups and 
prayer meetings”28 might play a role, and Dumsday suggests the same for 
“praying for the conversion of the world.”29 With regard to the discussion 
groups, Swinburne rightly points out that ordinary religious believers 
often possess insights into the nature of God that “the learned” have 
missed. Beyond that, the idea seems to be that, through petitionary prayer, 
we might cause God to intervene in the lives of others to bring about their 
conversion. It’s hard to know exactly how to evaluate this proposal without 
giving a fully developed theory of petitionary prayer. I’m not going to at-
tempt such a thing here, partly because that’s only tangentially related to 
the topic of this paper, but mostly because I don’t have a fully developed 
theory of petitionary prayer. I will simply note, first, that here again many 
seemingly honest atheists are dutifully prayed for by their loved ones 
(all are prayed for by those who pray for the conversion of the world!) 
and yet persist in their non-belief.30 Further, I’ll note that, in general, God 
seems to prefer largely letting our direct action determine what happens 
and intervenes only in relatively special circumstances. In any event, if 
there are other methods by which we can directly take responsibility for 
one another, it will be practically useful for us to know about these, since 
petitionary prayer is, of course, supposed to be a supplement to, not a 
replacement for, those actions we can take ourselves.31
Even if it turns out that the number of cases the responsibility argument 
can address will have to be severely limited, we might not necessarily 
view this as a problem; we could simply say that this explanation of di-
vine hiddenness covers only some cases, and that other cases will have 
to be explained in other ways.32 All the same, it is, of course, ceteris pa-
ribus, better from a theoretical point of view for the theist to expand the 
28Swinburne, Providence, 211.
29Dumsday, “Divine,” 365.
30One could have a view of petitionary prayer on which God is more responsive to the 
prayers of the wholeheartedly devout and morally upright (“The prayer of the righteous is 
powerful and effective,” James 5:16). Perhaps, then, if there were more who were whole-
heartedly devout and morally upright, our prayers for the conversion of the world would be 
more effective and the world would be closer to converting. Again, it’s hard to evaluate this 
proposal without a developed doctrine of petitionary prayer, which I don’t have. But I’ll note 
that such a proposal is in keeping with my stress that our account of the mechanisms should 
be holistic, in that it portrays our efficacy in taking responsibility for one another through 
prayer as dependent upon our entire lives and being, not just on how many times we open 
our prayer books.
31Consider, for instance, James 2:14–17: “What good is it, my brothers and sisters, if you 
say you have faith but do not have works? Can faith save you? If a brother or sister is naked 
and lacks daily food, and one of you says to them, ‘Go in peace; keep warm and eat your fill,’ 
and yet you do not supply their bodily needs, what is the good of that? So faith by itself, if it 
has no works, is dead.”
32In fact, Swinburne’s discussion of the responsibility argument is accompanied by a de-
fense of the claim that divine hiddenness is necessary for us to have free will at all. 
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argument’s scope as far as can be plausibly done. And again, it will be 
practically useful for us to know if there are other methods by which we 
can take responsibility for one another.
I think there are other methods, and I outlined some of them in the 
last section. It seems plenty clear—clearer still if we grant theism—that if 
religious communities were, and had been for a long time, more tolerant, 
more active in aiding the suffering, more closely knit, more spiritually dis-
ciplined, and so on, as well as more fostering of intellectual communities 
and relevant scholarly work, many people would find it much easier to be 
religious.33 And, if God exists and is perfectly good and loving, it seems 
entirely plausible that these virtues would aid us in discerning the divine 
nature and will and in developing our relationships with God.34 Further, 
neither Swinburne nor Dumsday explicitly consider the possibility that 
we might give others difficulties by posing positive hindrances to them, 
rather than simply by failing to meet our duties.35 It again seems fairly 
clear, however, that when religious believers exhibit moral apathy, commit 
heinous crimes in the name of their religion or pervert it for their own 
selfish purposes, and so on, they often leave others in a position where it’s 
more difficult for them to believe in or relate to God than if they’d never 
had anything to do with them.
It seems to me, then, that if we adopt this expanded conception of 
how we can relevantly help or hinder one another, we will be able to ad-
dress many cases that Swinburne and Dumsday’s accounts won’t have 
much to say about, and that where Swinburne and Dumsday’s accounts 
do offer explanations, invoking the expanded conception will often help 
us to provide explanations which are more thorough and plausible. 
Again, I’m defending my version of the responsibility argument only as 
a partial account of divine hiddenness, and so I don’t claim that even our 
33Dumsday does say that “Perhaps for some the principal means of carrying it out [taking 
responsibility for one another] is the leading of an exemplary life as a theist, providing an 
example to others of the fulfillment that a vibrant faith in God can provide, thus leading 
them to consider further God’s possible reality” (Dumsday, “Hiddenness,” 365). This remark 
is correct, but I think is insufficient in a number of ways: first, I suspect that for almost all 
ordinary believers, living such an exemplary life is a, or the, primary way in which they 
can contribute; second, living such an exemplary life can aid others in ways beyond simply 
causing them to “consider further God’s possible reality”; finally, Dumsday doesn’t really 
make any further use of anything in this discussion—when Schellenberg argues that natural 
theological arguments are not strong enough to convince all reasonable skeptics, Dumsday’s 
response (p. 369–370) is to argue that they are, in fact, stronger than Schellenberg thinks, 
rather than to point out that there are other methods by which we can take responsibility and 
which might be more effective in many or most cases.
34The conditional likelihood of both of these increases if we begin talking about specific 
instances of the major theistic traditions rather than just generic theism.
35When Swinburne considers ways in which inculpable non-belief may be the result of 
moral evil on the part of people other than the non-believer, he only offers that humans 
“may not have told each other about [‘good arguments for the existence of God’]” and that 
“humans may not have bothered to preach the gospel message” (Swinburne, Providence, 
203.) Dumsday doesn’t explicitly address the question, but I gather that the picture is again 
supposed to be one on which inculpable non-belief is explained by others’ failing to help the 
person in question rather than by their posing positive hindrances.
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expanded conception of the mechanisms will allow us to offer a plausible 
explanation of every case of hiddenness. But I do think we can address a 
reasonable number of cases and that adopting the expanded conception 
of the mechanisms leaves us in a better position than we would otherwise 
find ourselves in.
III.B. What about Temporally and Spatially Isolated Non-theists?
Schellenberg has also raised empirical objections about whether it is plau-
sible to believe that people in certain contexts could have the relevant sort 
of responsibility, focusing on spatially and temporally isolated non-the-
ists. Schellenberg tells us that “for long periods of human history perhaps 
no one was in a position to have or (thus) to fulfill the responsibility at 
issue here, since all the world was in the same boat in respect of ignorance 
of theism.”36 Likewise, still today many people are similarly isolated for 
geographical, cultural, or other reasons. What can we say about this? First, 
it is important to note that people in such circumstances often might still 
be able to bring one another closer to the truth about the divine. Imagine a 
Buddhist who greatly helps others better relate to the transcendent while 
thinking that the transcendent is impersonal, or perhaps an empathetic 
Viking who’s not entirely sold on human sacrifice.
Even so, the ability that these people have to take the relevant sort of 
responsibility for one another might, at least in some cases, be radically di-
minished. This might seem very confusing if (as Swinburne and Dumsday 
do) we imagine that God intentionally arranges for people to become iso-
lated in these ways. However, my account does not require that anyone 
ever actually be in such a position, though it implies that they could, if 
we fail to meet our duties to one another—which, clearly, we very often 
do. On this account, then, we should not imagine that God intentionally 
leaves these people without certain kinds of important knowledge for the 
sake of a rescue mission that no one could have been expected to be in a 
position to perform; rather, we might be able to trace their honest mistakes 
to culpable acts committed by people in the past—perhaps very far in the 
past, perhaps in pre-history.37 Of course, by the nature of the case we often 
won’t have any real way to find observational evidence for or against this, 
but if the rest of the account is plausible, something like this may well be 
true. And, again, I don’t want to claim that my account covers every case 
36John Schellenberg, Wisdom to Doubt: A Justification of Religious Skepticism (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2007), 240.
37Travis Dumsday has suggested to me what he regards as a “wacky” possibility: namely, 
that (as was believed by some patristic and medieval Christian theologians) angels were 
initially charged with instructing humans about divine truths, and that this teaching was dis-
rupted with the fall of Satan and his cronies, leading to widespread ignorance about God that 
is the result of wrongdoing but not human wrongdoing. One’s evaluation of this possibility 
will, presumably, be about the same as one’s evaluation of the analogous possibility (raised 
in the problem of evil debate) that natural evils are in fact the result of demonic wrongdoing. 
It’s worth noting that, since the belief in the angelic instructional hierarchy among Christians 
who accepted it was held for reasons more or less independent of our modern problem of 
divine hiddenness, it’s at least not as if the response, in this context, is ad hoc.
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of hiddenness, only enough to make it worth our attention. I believe, then, 
that Schellenberg’s empirical criticisms do not succeed in showing that my 
version of the responsibility argument fails to plausibly explain, or at least 
be a plausible partial explanation of, at least a great many cases of divine 
hiddenness.
IV. Is Responsibility Worth It?
IV.A. Does the Overwhelming Value of Relationship with God  
Undermine Accommodationism?
I will now attempt to address the normative arguments that Schellenberg 
has given. Schellenberg tells us that, before even examining particular ac-
counts, we should be able to see that any accommodationist response to 
the problem of divine hiddenness will fail, since no good could possibly 
be great enough to justify hindering someone’s relationship with God: 
“such relationship with an infinitely rich personal reality would have to 
be the greatest good any human being could possibly experience, if God 
exists. But then, one wants to ask, why talk of some other good, for the 
sake of which God might sacrifice such relationship?”38 Travis Dumsday’s 
response is to claim that being in relationship with God means cooper-
ating with God to achieve God’s aims, and that, given that people coming 
to knowledge of God is one of God’s most important aims, our taking re-
sponsibility for one another in this manner is an essential constitutive part 
of being in a relationship with God, so that we could not have a relation-
ship with God otherwise.39 Later, he softens this claim and says that our 
taking responsibility for one another in this way is only a necessary part 
of a “normal, robust relationship with God,” even if one might be able 
to have a relationship with God for at least some period of time without 
doing so. I worry that even this weaker claim might still be too strong (I 
doubt anyone would ever think to endorse it unless they were doing so 
in order to counter this very objection!) Fortunately, it is stronger than it 
needs to be.
Accommodationism is perfectly compatible with the claim that a rela-
tionship with God is the greatest good a creature can experience—even 
greater, even infinitely greater, than all other possible goods combined—
once we realize that God’s remaining hidden from someone in some way 
for some time doesn’t entail his sacrificing his relationship with them (at 
least where “sacrifice” means something strong enough for it to serve the 
role it needs to in Schellenberg’s argument.) God could have some kind 
of relationship with that person even at that point, and their relation-
ship might flourish greatly later. God’s hiding in the way required by the 
responsibility argument might even give us a chance to enhance our rela-
tionship with him. As Schellenberg himself notes, “there must be at any 
point after the beginning of a relationship with God literally an infinite 
38Schellenberg, Wisdom, 210.
39Dumsday, “Divine,” 364.
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number of ways of developing in relationship with God and experiencing 
wonderful new goods.”40 Perhaps some of these goods are made available 
by our having had, and having lived up to, the sort of responsibility in 
question. This, I think, allows us to satisfactorily answer Schellenberg’s 
worry without endorsing Dumsday’s implausibly strong claim about the 
necessity of our having this kind of responsibility.41
IV.B. Is This Too Much Responsibility?
Elsewhere, Schellenberg claims that God should have given us less re-
sponsibility for one another’s coming to knowledge of the divine than the 
responsibility argument requires.42 God could have made his existence suf-
ficiently clear to everyone who honestly considers the issue, and given us 
the task only of figuring out specific facts about God and convincing those 
who are willfully blind. This restricted responsibility would be superior, 
he thinks, because it would allow those who (in our world) inculpably 
disbelieve the ability to go ahead and start their relationship with God 
and because it would allow these people to go ahead and begin exercising 
the sort of responsibility the account in question says is so valuable. How-
ever, as we have already seen, many non-theists will have opportunities 
to exercise the sort of responsibility discussed here. Further, even if it is 
impossible for someone to have a relationship with God without believing 
that God exists, as Swinburne notes,43 people can take steps that will lay 
the foundations for a relationship with God when one does become avail-
able (this is basically required by the parable of the sheep and the goats 
in Matthew 25.)44 These considerations mitigate, but perhaps do not elimi-
nate, the points Schellenberg raises here. The defender of the responsibility 
argument will simply have to appeal to the fact that our having this sort 
of responsibility seems like something that could be tied to very valuable 
goods and to the fact that having any sort of robust responsibility may 
carry certain risks. Advocates of the responsibility argument don’t need to 
think that the trade-off of risk and reward that the argument suggests God 
chose is the “best” one; there may not be a best one. But in light of the argu-
ments raised throughout the rest of this paper, it may be a reasonable one, 
at least in some of the cases under consideration. The points Schellenberg 
raises here do not undermine that claim.
40Schellenberg, Wisdom, 210.
41This also lets us answer Schellenberg’s charge that God would desire relationship, not 
merely as a means of maximizing our welfare, but also for its own sake, so that he might not 
hide even if it was the best means of maximizing our welfare (Schellenberg, Divine, 23). Our 
having the relevant sort of responsibility might not only enhance our welfare, it might also 
(relatedly) enhance our relationship with God.
42Schellenberg, Divine, 192–194.
43Swinburne, Providence, 212n.
44In a non-theological context, the possibility that someone might have a relationship, or 
the groundwork for a relationship, with someone they don’t even know about is hinted at by 
Carly Rae Jepsen in “Call Me Maybe” with the intriguing line, “Before you came into my life, 
I missed you so bad . . . I missed you so, so bad.”
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IV.C. Does the Responsibility Argument Violate God’s Concern for  
Particular Individuals?
The final—and, I think, best—of the ethical arguments that Schellenberg 
considers concerns whether God is treating certain individuals in an un-
loving manner by sacrificing their well-being for the supposed greater 
good. Schellenberg tells us that “it should be evident on its face that a 
principle justifying the misfortune of certain individuals on the grounds 
of their usefulness when those individuals are unaware of their usefulness 
and might not choose to be thus useful if the matter were put to them, and 
when perfectly fine goods—including important responsibilities . . . —may 
be secured in other ways, is at the very least problematic.”45 It does seem 
to me that this might be an unacceptable consequence. However, it doesn’t 
seem to me that the responsibility argument requires that something like 
this be true. Again, many people who are importantly wrong about God 
will still have the ability to exercise some sort of positive responsibility of 
the type discussed in this paper, and to form relationships based around 
this, in this life, and those who don’t may have such opportunities in the 
afterlife—either by, as Dumsday suggests,46 helping us through something 
like the intercession of the saints, or by helping one another in some future 
heavenly or purgatorial realm. Further, if there are people who, even in the 
afterlife, never have such opportunities—or who just irreversibly bungle 
all the ones they have—they might still value being part of a heavenly 
community in which some people had such opportunities and made the 
most of them. (What’s doing the work here is something like the idea that 
it can be a benefit to you to be part of a close-knit community in which 
people have very meaningful relationships with one another, even if you 
personally weren’t part of the experiences that helped them form these 
relationships.) It’s possible that, while reasonably regretting the fact that 
humans didn’t fulfill their responsibilities better than they did, many of 
those who Schellenberg portrays as having their well-being sacrificed will, 
sub specie aeternitatis, rationally not regret, even from a purely self-regarding 
perspective, God’s giving us this responsibility, on account of the benefits 
that, in the long run, accrue to them and their loved ones as result.47 If 
this is so, it is hard see how we could accuse God of acting in an unloving 
manner towards them in giving humans this sort of responsibility.
All that being said, one might still think that the sorts of good discussed 
in this paper can’t plausibly justify God’s actions in the most disturbing 
45Schellenberg, Wisdom, p. 240.
46Dumsday, “Divine,” 367–368.
47This suggestion is, of course, indebted to the work of Marilyn Adams, though it differs 
from her proposal in important ways (namely, Adams’s proposal requires that we come to 
rationally not regret the horrors we suffer themselves, while my proposal requires only that we 
rationally not regret God’s giving us the responsibility that made the relevant evils real pos-
sibilities, even in light of the badness of the (themselves regrettable) evils whose possibility 
they necessitated.) See Marilyn McCord Adams, Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999).
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cases of divine hiddenness. God’s hiddenness, as we’ve discussed, 
contributes to some unspeakably awful things. One might think it’s ri-
diculous—even offensive—to suggest that God’s allowing these horrors 
could be explained by his concern for the goods appealed to in this paper. 
Speaking poetically, one might think, with Ivan Karamazov’s Grand In-
quisitor, that if God’s giving us the sort of free will that we allegedly have 
is what’s supposed to explain God’s allowing the most horrific evils we 
commit, then when he gave this free will to us, his love for us clouded his 
good judgment—that he thought too highly of us, that he wouldn’t have 
given us such a gift if he’d had a more realistic assessment of what fragile 
creatures like us would do with it to one another and to ourselves. If you 
think that the goods appealed to in this paper couldn’t explain God’s al-
lowing the most horrific results of divine hiddenness, I’m not inclined to 
argue. I’m reluctant, for both epistemological and moral reasons, to try to 
make judgments about what could explain God’s allowing evils that are so 
much worse than anything I’ve ever experienced—in fact, so much worse 
than anything I could even imagine. But I never asserted that my account 
could give us an exhaustive statement of why God acts as he does, only 
that, plausibly, it can help us understand at least some of God’s reasons in 
at least some cases of hiddenness. That, I think, is credible, it may be all we 
can reasonably aim for, and for the responsibility argument to be worth 
our attention, it is enough.48
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